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Logics of Reasonable Discussion
In logics of reasonable discussion, arguments are approached as given through
a discussion between the opposite parties who try to resolve a conflict of opinion. In
formal dialectics (Barth and Krabbe, 1982; Krabbe, 1985a, 1985b, 1986), the rules for
reasonable debate are grounded in deductive dialectical validity, originally defined by
Lorenzen (1961, 1978) and in accordance with Beth’s ways of constructing proofs in
logic (Beth, 1962). In that theory, fallacies are dialogue moves that do not conform to
the dialogue rules. On the other hand, positively evaluated dialogue moves are those
that conform to the dialogue rules and lead to a proper closing move (preferably in
favor of the party who makes it). These two options of evaluating dialogue moves
correspond to the principles of evaluating arguments as either deductively non-valid
(fallacious) or deductively valid, in terms of winning strategies (Barth and Krabbe,
1982; 54).
Deductive validity is not the main criterion of reasonableness in the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992).
That theory is pragmatic since it defines argumentation as a complex speech act, in
accordance with Austin’s (1962) and Searle´s (1969) pragma-linguistics. It is
dialectical in its providing the rules and norms for the use of the complex speech act
of argumentation by the two opposite parties involved in reasonable argumentative
discussion. The pragma-dialecticians analyze the traditional fallacies as discussion
moves contrary to pragma-dialectical rules and norms. The standard fallacies are
classified relative to the stage at which a party makes the incorrect move, the type of
the reasoning involved and the role the party has in the discussion (Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1992). For instance, one type of ad verecundiam fallacy, the ad
verecundiam2 is based on a move that the Protagonist makes contrary to Rule 2, at the
opening stage of a critical discussion. According to Rule 2, the obligation to defend an
advanced standpoint, the burden of proof, is on the party whose standpoint has been
questioned in the dispute, namely, the Protagonist. The Protagonist commits the ad
verecundiam2 when presenting a standpoint as unquestionably acceptable (uncapable
to be reasonably challenged or further defended, when challenged) because of the
personal guarantee of an authority (1992; 116-120; 216).
Woods and Walton’s pluralistic dialectical framework (1982, 1989) is related
to the works of Lorenzen, Hintikka (1979, 1981) Barth and Krabbe (1982), and
specially influenced by Hamblin (1970, 1971) and Rescher (1976, 1977). The WoodsWalton framework for analyses of arguments and fallacies encompasses non-classical
(many-valued) formal logic, deductive, inductive and plausible reasoning. In their
approach, the idea of relative strictness is important: we cannot expect all arguments
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to be equally strong and hence evaluated only as sound or unsound. Many of them are
relatively good or bad, more or less plausible, depending on their context and purpose.
In his recent works (Walton, 1984, 1987, 1992, 1996, 1997), Walton has
introduced principles of argument evaluation that differentiate between three levels of
argument strength. In contrast to the fallacious (non-reasonable) dialogue moves, in
the reasonable dialogue moves, plausibly weak or plausibly strong arguments are
used. But that distinction does not seem precise enough. For fallacies are defined only
by referring to the bad ways of using arguments (when, for example, the ad
verecundiam is defined as suppressing the critical questions by a blocking move in a
characteristic dialogue). However, the reasonable arguments are defined by referring
both to the good arguments and to the good ways of using them (to the arguments
both given in the characteristic logical form and presented without blocking the
opposite party’s right to ask one of the critical questions; see, for instance, Walton,
1997; 252). Consequently, Walton’s evaluative concepts switch over two different
dimensions of argumentation: the quality of reasoning and the way of using the
reasoning in argumentation. Even if transgressing the simple dichotomy valid/nonvalid, the threefold evaluative concepts are therefore still not adequate to deal with
contextual characteristics of argumentation rightly indicated in Walton’s works.
Apart from his work on fallacies and other contributions to argumentation
theory (for instance, Woods, 1977, 1978, 1993), John Woods has recently claimed
that fallacies are an intrinsic aspect of human reasoning. Argumentation analyses
should point out the way in which the fallacies play a role in human survival (1992,
1995, with Gabbay, 2003) and consider the possibility of applying such analyses to
“intractable disagreements about matters of life and death” (2000a, 2000b).
In showing why the standard definition of fallacies (“arguments that seem to
be valid, when they actually are not”) is not adequate for analyzing most of the
traditional fallacies, logics of reasonable discussion define fallacies as moves contrary
to the given system of discussion rules. For example, something is a fallacy because it
blocks the resolution of the initial conflict of opinion, through such dialogue moves by
which one party suppresses the opposite party’s right to make the correct dialogue
moves in obtaining the relevant information.
Continuing a dialogue and neglecting that a fallacy has been committed, may
have manipulative advantages for the party that has committed the fallacy. That party
has then allegedly succeeded in convincing the opposite party to accept or reject
certain point of view. But such a way of winning an argumentative dialogue is not
considered as a victory of reasonableness, nor as a resolution of the conflict of
opinion; it is rather a consequence of manipulative communication through appealing
to the opposite party’s psychological features, lack of information and the like.
Krabbe and Walton use profiles of dialogue, as logical tools to analyze
fallacies. Assuming the theoretical background of a given dialogue model, they use
these diagrams to structure argumentative dialogues as tree-branches, representing the
regular sequences of dialogue-moves for the Proponent and the Opponent of a given
claim. For example, in Walton (1997), the ad verecundiam fallacy is approached
through the dialectical method of evaluation: the type and the logical form of
arguments from expert opinion are defined, the characteristic critical questions are
delineated, the appropriate type of dialogue is specified and the evaluative concepts
are given to characterize presumptive arguments from expert opinion as reasonable
(weak or strong) or fallacious. Here is Walton´s example of an actual dialogue
containing the ad verecundiam fallacy:
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Respondent:
Proponent:
Respondent:
Proponent:

Why A?
Because E asserts that A, and E is an expert.
Is E´s assertion based on evidence?
How could you evaluate such evidence? You are not expert in this field of
scientific knowledge.
(Walton, 1997; 253)

Walton suggests the following profile of dialogue as the tool of the normative model
for the actual dialogue exchange.
R: Why A?

P: E asserts A.

R: Evidence base used by E?

(1) P cites evidence

(2) P admits evidence not known

(3) P admits there was
no evidence given

The three moves that follow the Respondent’s critical question represent all
admissible moves the Proponent may make in such a dialogue-situation, if he wants to
advance a reasonable argument from expert opinion. By using the profile of dialogue,
we may see that the Proponent in the actual dialogue makes the ad verecundiam
fallacy, as Walton defines it: instead of making one of the three admissible moves, the
Proponent blocks the Respondent’s critical question about the evidence the expert
used. The Proponent tries to represent the Respondent’s question as illegitimate, by
appealing to the emotions of modesty the Respondent is expected to feel when the
authority of the relevant scientific knowledge is mentioned in the argument. (For
profiles of dialogue and fallacy criticism, see also Krabbe, 1992, 1996, 2002b.)
In Walton and Krabbe (1995), many fallacies are characterized as an improper
shift between different types of dialogues. In so characterizing fallacies, Walton and
Krabbe distinguish between different types of dialogues: persuasion dialogue (critical
discussion), negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking dialogue and
eristics. Each of the dialogue types has its characteristic initial situation, different
main goals, specific aims of the participants, and particular side benefits. For instance,
the initial situation of the persuasion dialogue consists of the conflicting points of
view of the parties whose goal is to resolve the conflict by argumentative means,
whereas the aim of each participant is to persuade the other party to accept a certain
point of view. The characteristic initial situation in a quarrel (a subtype of eristics) is
antagonism between the persons involved whose main goal is to reach a provisional
accommodation in a relationship, whereas the aims of the parties is striking the other
party and/or winning in the eyes of the onlookers (Walton and Krabbe, 1995; 77-79).
The following conversation illustrates what Walton and Krabbe call a fallacy
of bargaining, based on a dialectical shift from persuasion dialogue to negotiation:
A doctor [tries to convince her patient to] quit both smoking and drinking,
giving medical reasons for the recommendation.
Patient: O.K. I´ll quit smoking, as long as you allow a glass of wine once in a
while (according to Walton and Krabbe, 1995, 104).
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If passed unnoticed, the fallacy the patient makes when shifting from
persuasion to negotiation may involve the doctor in the discussion of a completely
other type. The shift changes the context of conversation so that the patient’s
(possible) success in reaching the goals of the negotiation (and in avoiding to consider
the medical facts) might be presented as an alleged success in reaching the goals of
the persuasion dialogue. It might also be claimed that the shift blocks argumentative
conflict resolution since the patient does not attempt to analyze logically the doctor’s
reasons for the advanced claim. In this way, the characterization of fallacies as
inappropriate dialogue shifts can be connected with the definitions of fallacies as the
dialogue moves that block the conflict resolution.
Walton and Krabbe (1995; 108) define two other types of dialogue shifts
related to the explanation of fallacies. Internal dialogue shifts are shifts in attitudes,
sets of participants, or subjects discussed inside one particular type of dialogue. Shifts
in dialogue flavors may change quality of a given dialogue. For instance, a quarrel
flavor may be introduced in a persuasion dialogue and incline the participants to
abandon the rules of persuasive discussion.
In his recent works, Krabbe distinguishes different levels of logical dialogues
making thus formal dialectics suitable for fallacy criticism. Systems of rules for the
metadialogues are connected to the object dialogues (the existing systems of formal
dialectics), so as to regulate logically adequate ways of shifting between the latter and
the fallacy discussions in the metadialogues (Krabbe, 1992, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b).
Transactional Analysis
The theory of transactional analysis (henceforth denoted as TA) originated in
the psychotherapeutic practice and theoretical works of the Canadian psychiatrist,
Eric Bernstein (Berne, 1961, 1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1972) and his collaborators and
followers (for instance, Steiner, 1974; Dusay, 1972; English, 1971, 1972; Goulding
and Goulding, 1976, 1979; Crossman, 1966; Klein, 1980; Clarkson, 1992; James and
Contributors, 1977; Stewart, 1996, 2000). Even if TA is mostly about the cure of
psychopathological behavior, its theoretical framework is suitable for analyzing wellfunctioning behavior and communication. Some of its results, I would like to claim,
might contribute to further development of the principles for discovering and
confronting the logically unacceptable moves in argumentation.
TA approaches the individual in his social surroundings, in which during his
growing up he receives different psychophysical stimuli, strokes, from the closest
caretakers (usually parents). This early stroke training forms the individual’s
personality (dis)ordering, the habits in his time structuring and emotional reacting, as
well as the ways of asking for, receiving and giving strokes in the usual transactions
during his life.
Personality is in TA structured by the ego states-model. It is claimed that
through our conscious or preconscious life, we operate from one of the three different
ego states: the Parent, the Adult and the Child; and that we continuously switch
between them. The ego states may be identified by the behavioral, social, historical
and phenomenological modes of the ego states-diagnosis (Berne, 1961; 66-69).
An ego state may be described phenomenologically as a coherent system of
feelings related to a given subject, and operationally as a set of coherent
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behavior patterns; or pragmatically, as a system of feelings which motivates a
related set of behavior patterns (Berne, 1961; xvii).
According to Berne (1961), the Child is a set of feelings, attitudes and behavior
patterns that exist as relics in the adult person. It is preserved in the exact forms of
behavior, emotional reactions, ways of speaking, mannerisms etc. that the person used
to express as a child.
[T]his phenomenon has been repeatedly reported in connection with dreams,
hypnosis, psychosis, pharmacological intoxicants, and direct electrical
stimulation of the temporal cortex. But careful observation carried the
hypothesis one step further, to the assumption that such relics can exhibit
spontaneous activity in the normal waking state as well (Berne, 1961; 11).
The healthy Child is said to be the best part of a person, the source of enjoying life,
being spontaneous, creative, sexual. It also motivates the activities of the Adult so as
to receive most of the pleasure from the successful learning and adaptation.
When healthy, the Adult ego state is an autonomous set of feelings, behavior
patterns and attitudes adequate for different aspects of the real, external environment.
Its function is to regulate learning, adaptation, intelligence skills, and organization of
a person, to provide her with responsibility, reliability, sincerity and courage.
The Parent is a set of feelings, behavior patterns and attitudes formed by a
person’s re-playing the corresponding features of his parents or other authorities. The
function of this ego state is to form certain automatic, habitual behavior and a set of
rational prohibitive attitudes through which we save time and psychophysical energy.
It also provides people with the capacity to help and protect another individual. (For
elaborate ego states-model, see Berne, 1961, 1966b; Steiner, 1974; Klein, 1980;
Stewart, 2000.)
The ideal of a healthy person is in TA seen as the achieved ability to live and
behave as a spontaneous, autonomous and intimate person, able to express each of the
ego states through its characteristic and uninhibited feelings and behavior. The Adult
is executive and able to adequately include the Child and the Parent in the socially
proper transactions. TA initiates changes in psychopathological behavior and provides
training in adequate transactions, relative to a particular person and its social
surroundings. Some works are about analyzing or TA-counselling of well-functioning
people (Berne, 1963; Jongeward and Contributors, 1973; Stewart, 1996, 2000). Four
aspects of TA may be distinguished: structural analysis, analysis of transactions,
analysis of games, analysis of scripts.
The structural analysis approaches human behavior through the ego states´
functioning. Psychopathological behavior is explained (by referring to standard
classifications) as contamination or exclusion of a given ego state (characteristic for
structural pathology), or the lability of cathexis and the permeability of the boundaries
between the ego states (characteristic for functional pathology). (See Berne, 1961,
1966b; Steiner, 1974; James, 1977; Klein, 1980; Stewart, 1996, 2000.)
The analysis of transactions is observation of the ways in which a personality
structure functions in communication with the others: Which ego state is most often
executive, and in which way? What kind of transactions the person is usually engaged
in? Are there some symptomatic shifts between the ego states? Which underlying
conflicts are expressed through the transactions? Which manipulative behavior
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patterns does the person exemplify? In which manipulative transactions of the other
people is the person most easily involved? Consider the following situation:
One day, Camellia, following a previous train of thought, announced that she
had told her husband she was not going to have intercourse with him any more
and that he could go and find himself some other woman. Rosita asked
curiously: “Why did you do that?” Whereupon Camellia burst into tears and
replied: “I try so hard and then you criticize me” (Berne, 1961; 88).
After Camellia’s reaction, Rosita stays silent, but another women from the group,
Holly, jumps in and reassures Camellia that she should not be upset since everyone in
the group is on her side and everything will certainly be fine. Berne analyzed these
transactions by using the following diagrams.
Diagram 1

Diagram 2

P

P

P

A

A

C

C

P

Transactional
stimulus

A

stimulus

A

Transactional
response

C
Camellia

Rosita

response

Camellia

Diagram 3

C
Rosita

Diagram 4
response

P

P

P

P

A

A

A

C

C

Rosita

Camellia

response

A
C
Camellia

stimulus

stimulus

C
Holly

The three women’s personalities are structured by the ego states, where P
stays for the Parent, A for the Adult and C for the Child. On diagram 1, the
transactional stimulus comes from Camellia’s Adult, who is executive when Camellia
describes her decision to the audience. Rosita´s Adult is executive in the transactional
response, since her question expresses her mature curiosity about the described event.
On diagram 2, Rosita´s answer is taken as a new transactional stimulus, to which
Camellia does not answer by her Adult who would have provided the requested
information, as expected by the stimulus. She makes a shift in her ego state instead,
making her Child executive when reading Rosita´s question as an accusation.
Camellia’s defensive accusation is addressed to Rosita´s Parent, and contains an
attempt to initiate the corresponding shift in Rosita´s ego state.
By refusing to answer to Camellia’s Child accusation, Rosita, however, does
not accept the invitation to make her Parent executive in the communication. She
decides to stay in her Adult, being aware that she has not criticized Camellia. What is
6
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on diagram 2 described as Camellia’s response, is on diagram 3 a new transactional
stimulus in which Camellia’s Child addresses Rosita´s Parent. Rosita´s silent stimulus
to Camellia’s Adult is represented by the Adult response on diagram 3. Holly
provides the complementary Parent defense of Camellia’s Child, which is represented
on diagram 4.
On diagrams 1 and 4, we see complementary transactions; diagrams 2 and 3
illustrate crossed transactions (Berne, 1961, 1966b). A complementary transaction
may be characterized as one in which: (1) the executive ego state in a transactional
response is the ego state addressed by the corresponding transactional stimulus, and
(2) the response appeals to the ego state from which the stimulus has been executed.
The transaction is crossed when: (1) the executive ego state in a transactional
response is different from the ego state addressed by the corresponding transactional
stimulus, or (2) when the response does not appeal to the ego state executive in the
stimulus. Neither complementary nor crossed transactions are good or bad in
themselves. They obtain certain meaning and value through aims and achievements of
a particular conversation. Manipulative ways of using complementary transactions are
analyzed in TA explanation of the games and scripts.
In the psychological games, there are one or more theses to be defended and
players take particular roles and make specific moves through complementary ulterior
transactions. By playing the games, the players (usually without awareness) aim at
obtaining advantages (the compulsory satisfaction of the transformed biological,
social and psychological needs) (Berne, 1966a, 50-58).
Ulterior transactions are those transactions that operate at two different levels:
at the social level, a transactional stimulus from an ego state of a person is addressed
to an ego state of another person, whereas at the psychological level, another kind of
stimulus is sent and different ego states are involved. The complementary ulterior
transactions are needed for the successful playing of the games since they do not
block the game-communication.
The earliest discovered game of that type, Why Don’t You, Yes But (YDYB), is
obvious in the next dialogue (following Berne, 1966a):
White:
Black:
White:
Blue:
White:
Red:
White:
Brown:
White:

“My girl friend insists on making her own clothes, but she never
succeeds in making anything charming to wear. What shall I do?”
“Why doesn’t she take a course in clothes making?”
“Yes, but she doesn’t have time.”
“Why don’t you buy her some books on clothes making?”
“Yes, but she doesn’t know how to use them.”
“Why don’t you buy her some nice clothes?”
“Yes, but that would cost too much.”
“Why don’t you accept what she does the way she does it?”
“Yes, but the clothes she makes don’t look good, you know.”

According to Berne,
Since the solutions are, with rare exceptions, rejected, it is apparent that this
game must serve some ulterior purpose. YDYB is not played for its ostensible
purpose (an Adult quest for information or solutions), but to reassure and
gratify the Child. A bare transcript may sound Adult, but in the living tissue it
can be observed that White presents [himself] as a Child inadequate to meet
the situation; whereupon the others become transformed into sage Parents
7
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anxious to dispense their wisdom for [his] benefit. […] The game can proceed
because at the social level both stimulus and response are Adult to Adult, and
at the psychological level they are also complementary, with Parent to Child
stimulus (”Why don’t you…”) eliciting Child to Parent response (“Yes,
but…”). The psychological level is usually unconscious on both sides, but the
shifts in ego state (Adult to “inadequate” Child on White’s part, Adult to
“wise” Parent by the others) can often be detected by an alert observer from
changes in posture, muscular tone, voice and vocabulary (Berne, 1966a, 117).
Diagram 5 represents Berne´s analysis of the game transactions.
Diagram 5
Psychological
level

P
A

P
Social level

C
White
(R: “Yes, but…”)

A

C
others
(S: “Why don’t you…”)

The other elements of the game are omitted here, being beyond the focus of this
article. For a complete analysis of YDYB and other games, see Berne, 1966a.
The main goal of the game analysis is raising the awareness of the games a
person plays, and of the reasons for playing them, as well as learning to recognize the
ways of initiating the games and being involved in the games of the other people. The
techniques are developed for recognizing and confronting the game-transactions, and
are supported by the parallel training in reaching autonomy, intimacy and spontaneity
(for instance, in Berne, 1966a; James, 1977; Clarkson, 1992; Stewart, 1996, 2000).
Another aspect of TA is the analysis of scripts. The scripts are life dramas that
people in their childhood accept, without awareness, as characterizing their lives, due
to the influence of good and bad, directly and indirectly given word, gesture or
physical touching messages of the closest caretakers and the other authorities in their
child world. The goal of the script analysis is to block out the compulsive behavior
patterns resulting from the script decisions, to initiate the change in the corresponding
fantasies and to encourage person’s free choice of his life’s quality (Berne 1961,
1666b; Steiner, 1974; Goulding and Goulding, 1976, 1979; English, 1971, 1972;
Klein, 1980; Stewart, 1996, 2000).
For the purpose of this article, the most important results of TA are the
successful analyses of the manipulative transactional strategies grounded in the ego
states-shifts. The TA decomposing of the ulterior transactions warns us that the
achievement of cooperation in argumentative discussion requires still other logical
techniques than only those assumed in the logics of reasonable discussion. Even if
these other transaction-logical aspects of the argumentative resolution of conflicts of
opinion (i.e. the underlying personal conflicts and ulterior transactions involved) are
neither explicitly given nor contained in the implicit meanings of the claims or
reasons advanced, they are both observable and relevant in persuasive dialogues.
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Transactional Analysis and Fallacies
Hamblin (1970) advanced excellent arguments to show why the ideal of
validity cannot be the criterion for defining fallacies. His work much influenced the
new definitions of the fallacies given in models for reasonable discussion (see the first
part of this article). In all of these models, the standard definition of the fallacies, as
“arguments that seem to be valid, when they actually are not,” is rightly abandoned.
Still, in the new definitions of the fallacies, another characteristic of the
standard definition, namely, that a logical fallacy is an “argument that seems to be
valid, when it actually is not,” is neglected. Certainly, the ideal of validity should be
changed for more adequate criteria of defining the fallacies. But the appearance of a
bad argument as a good argument is important for adequately approaching the
sophistical reasoning so characteristic for fallacies (see the classical approach,
Aristotle, 1928). We should therefore save the corresponding part of the standard
definition and remember that the inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts (which
satisfy the common fallacy criteria in the new definitions) are also presented in a
specific way, namely so that the opposite party in a discussion cannot easily recognize
them as improper discussion moves. We may consequently transform the standard
definition and claim that a logical fallacy is committed when an inappropriate
dialogue move or shift is made so as to make it seem to constitute proper part of the
discussion, whereas it actually does not.
Some results for the logics of reasonable discussion are that (1) the procedures
of discovering fallacies should suggest techniques for discovering and confronting the
tricky aspects of argumentation that make the wrong moves or shifts seem as the
proper parts of the discussion; (2) the definitions of fallacies should comprise and
distinguish between the aspects of reasoning (the good or bad arguments) and the
social aspects (the good or bad ways of using arguments) of argumentation.
I would first try to show how some results of TA might be combined with the
new definitions of fallacies so as to improve the logical models of discussion in
accordance with task (1). Consider again Walton´s example of an ad verecundiam
fallacy given on page 3. Provided that we accept Walton´s (or a similar) definition of
this fallacy, we may, following the reasoning advanced above, try to recognize the
tricky aspects which may block not only the Respondent’s right to make the proper
dialectical move, but also his ability to realize that the right is blocked. And here TA
comes into play: it may be observed that the improper dialogue moves or shifts in
argumentative discussions are usually made through ulterior transactions containing
the corresponding shifts in ego states. The manipulative strength of these ulterior
transactions is what often makes the inappropriate dialogue move or shift seem
logically adequate when it actually is not.
In Walton´s example of an ad verecundiam fallacy, the ulterior transaction
contained in the characteristic blocking dialogue move is represented by the following
TA diagram:

9
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Diagram 6
response

P
A
C
Proponent

P
stimulus
response

A
C
Respondent

At the social level, the Proponent responds to the Respondent’s Adult stimulus
request for the information by asking an allegedly Adult question about the
Respondent’s ability to estimate the quality of the evidence requested. At the
psychological level, the Proponent’s ulterior response contains the ego state shift,
which results by his Parental accusation of the Respondent’s Child.
There are two options for the next Respondent’s move. First, it may be a
complementary ulterior transaction, when the Parental Proponent’s response (taken
now as a new stimulus) incites the Respondent’s Child to obstruct her own Adult
ability to logically consider the obtained response and recognize it as a move that is
blocking the dialogue. In such a situation, at the social level, the Respondent’s Adult
says something like: “Yes, you are right. I’m not an expert in this field and should
therefore not challenge but simply accept the opinion of the expert you cited.” At the
psychological level, the Respondent’s Child reacts to the Proponent’s Parent stimulus
by feeling modesty and reverence confronted with the authority of the cited expert,
and responds by a message like: “Shame on me, how stupid I am!”
However, the Respondent has a second option: she may initiate a crossed nonulterior transaction. When doing so, she recognizes the Proponent’s Parental appeal
to the Respondent’s Child and refuses the corresponding shift in her ego states: she
decides to stay in her Adult who can confront the logically wrong move made by the
Proponent. The Respondent’s crossed non-ulterior transaction is obvious in her Adult
response: “My non-expertise in this field does not mean that the expert opinion you
state is unquestionably acceptable. Besides, you didn’t answer the question.” The
following TA diagram represents these two options for the Respondent’s move.
Diagram 7

stimulus

stimulus

P

P

P

A

stimulus
response

A

A

C

response

C

C

Proponent

Respondent

Proponent
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P
stimulus
response

A
C
Respondent
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Fallacies and the Evaluative Scale
Let us now consider task (2) formulated on page 9 and relate the suggested
definition of fallacies to the techniques for differentiating and evaluating the
reasoning and the social aspects of argumentation. In that way, we will approach the
static and dynamic aspects of argument evaluation.
In distinguishing between the reasoning and the social aspects, I will rely on
some results from Jovičić (2002). In that work, argumentative strategy (AR-strategy)
is defined as a way in which an argumentative group (AR-group) avails itself both of
the reasoning aspects and the social aspects in an argumentative activity with the aim
of persuading the audience group (the A-group) to accept the advanced thesis. The
evaluative principles are defined relative to the A-group, it being assumed that in
evaluating an AR-strategy, it is essential to know the audience at which the strategy is
aimed. Attempts to specify universal evaluative criteria are, therefore, considered as
misguided.
It is further claimed that the reasoning aspects of an AR-strategy comprise the
theses advanced, the reasons given to support them, and the logical relations between
the theses and the reasons. The social aspects of the AR-strategy comprise the ways
in which the AR-group uses the relevant characteristics of the A-group so as to make
the argumentation more attractive for the A-group. Some of these characteristics are
the interests of the A-group concerning the AR-strategy, the activity or passivity of
the A-group, its knowledge of the reasoning context, and its challenge potential
(expressed through the relevance of the A-group’s evaluation and the possibility of
having an effect on the AR-group).
The evaluative concepts are defined for estimating the AR-strategies: the
reasoning aspects may be acceptable, unacceptable, or both acceptable and
unacceptable. (Note that an evaluation as both acceptable and unacceptable reasoning
is not a real contradiction, since each of the contradictory evaluative terms refers to
different reasoning aspects of a complex AR-strategy. It is also different from
evaluating reasoning as neither acceptable nor unacceptable, since, in contrast to the
latter, it does not imply that people are indifferent to the reasoning or do not have
enough information to evaluate it, but simply see that there are equally many, equally
important reliable as unreliable aspects of the reasoning.) The acceptability means
that, in the reasoning of the AR-strategy, the AR-group uses reasons that really
support the thesis. The criteria for reasons supporting the thesis should be defined
precisely, with respect to the logical relation on which the reasoning relies. For
instance, the evaluative criteria for reasoning in which the reasons supporting the
theses are opinions of authorities are provided in Jovičić, 2002. Other kinds of
reasoning require different criteria.
The social aspects of an AR-strategy may be used in an effective, ineffective or
both effective and ineffective way. Effectiveness means that the AR-group appeals to
the characteristics of the A-group in a way that makes the argumentative activity
attractive to the A-group. An example of providing the evaluative criteria for
effectiveness may be found in Jovičić, 2003.
Assuming all defined possibilities, the entire AR-strategy may be evaluated,
relative to the A-group, by the following combinations of evaluative concepts:
(1) Acceptable and effective;
(2) Acceptable, and both effective and ineffective;
(3) Acceptable but ineffective;
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Both acceptable and unacceptable, and effective;
Both acceptable and unacceptable, and both effective and ineffective;
Both acceptable and unacceptable, but ineffective;
Unacceptable but effective;
Unacceptable and both effective and ineffective;
Unacceptable and ineffective,

where evaluations are ordered, so that the first one is the most, the last one the least
valuable (whereas the distinction between 3 and 4 is not sharp).
Let us now come back to the suggested definition of fallacies. Being
characterized as inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts made so as to make them
seem as proper parts of the discussion, fallacies are the unacceptable but effective ARstrategies (described by point 7 on the scale). The inappropriate dialogue move or
shift corresponds to an unacceptable AR-strategy (since the reasons provided by the
reasoning in such a strategy, as well as by the inappropriate dialogue moves or shifts,
either do not support the thesis or are not provided at all). The way of presenting the
inappropriate move so as to make it seem as proper part of the discussion corresponds
to the effective appeal to the social aspects of the AR-strategy.
The manipulative aspects of the unacceptable but effective AR-strategy
(reflected in the effective ways of presenting bad reasoning as a good one) turn such a
strategy into a fallacy. Fallacy criticism would in that way be distinguished from other
kinds of argumentation criticism, which are still available according to the principles
of the evaluative scale.
The Static and Dynamic Aspects in Argument Evaluation
By the static aspects in argument evaluation, I mean the fixed elements that
have to be taken into account in evaluating many different types of argumentation. In
contrast to that, dynamic aspects are adaptive to particular contexts and to different
points of view relative to which argumentation is evaluated.
Let us first consider these static and dynamic aspects concerning the present
definition of fallacies combined with the suggested evaluative scale. Instead of taking
criticism of fallacies as the only way of criticizing bad argumentation (as usual in
logics of reasonable discussion, except in Krabbe, 1992, 1996, 2002b), the evaluative
scale differentiates between the following three types of criticism:
(1) Fallacy confrontation (confronting the effective ways of presenting wrong
dialogue moves or shifts as if they are proper parts of discussion). That type of
criticism is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point 7 at the evaluative
scale and some aspects of strategies described by points 8, 4 and 5.
(2) Criticism of the unacceptable and ineffective AR-strategies (criticizing
untenable theses, unreliable or irrelevant reasons given to support the
corresponding theses or/and providing active criticism. For the principles of
active criticism, see Krabbe, 1999, 2002b). Criticism of the unacceptable but
ineffective AR-strategies is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point 9 at
the evaluative scale and at some aspects of the strategies described by points 5,
6 and 8.
(3) Criticism of the ineffective but acceptable AR-strategies (criticizing
persuasively ineffective ways of appealing to the characteristics of the A-
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group). That type of criticism is aimed at the AR-strategies described by point
3 and at some aspects of the strategies described by points 2, 5 and 6 at the
evaluative scale.
The suggested definition of fallacies presupposes a general concept of fallacies
and may therefore be seen as static. It allows, however, for dynamic evaluation of
fallacies, being suitable for taking into consideration the varying contexts of the
fallacy-confrontation. It grants that there are different types of unacceptable reasoning
contained in the fallacies, as well as different effective ways of appealing to the social
characteristics so as to make the unacceptable reasoning seem to constitute a proper
part of discussion. The adequate classifications of such effective appeals and of
techniques for confronting them remain to be specified.
As a general conceptual framework, the evaluative scale assumes a static
conceptual net, comprising for instance the concept of AR-strategies, the reasoning
and the social aspects of argumentation, different types of criticism, classification of
distinct logical relations between the claims and the reasons, the combinations of the
acceptability and the effectiveness as the general evaluative concepts, or the static
plausibility ordering between the nine evaluative combinations.
The static conceptual net displays, however, the following dynamic aspects:
(1) Ordered plurality of evaluative levels. The nine evaluative levels at the scale
are adequate for estimating the differences in logical strength of
argumentation. Dynamic argumentative practice seldom contains only sound
or unsound (valid or non-valid, either good or bad) arguments. Accordingly,
the scale evaluates argumentation, as Ralph Johnson (2000) puts it, “in a
continuum from strong to weak, with various points in between.”
(2) Context-sensibility. The concepts of acceptability and effectiveness are
suitable for introducing particular evaluative sub-criteria varying with respect
to the types of reasons advanced, the specific logical relations between the
claims and the reasons, the role certain claims have in the reasoning, and
relative to the social characteristics of the pertinent A-groups.
(3) A possibility to alternate evaluation relative to different points of view. The
evaluative procedure assumed by the scale acknowledges the fact that one and
the same AR-strategy may be evaluated in one way when analyzed by the ARgroup, in a rather different way when approached by the A-group.
(4) The dynamics of manipulative appeals to the social characteristics. An
effective appeal to the social characteristics may be manipulative or nonmanipulative, relative to the reasoning linked with. When combined with an
acceptable (or both acceptable and unacceptable) reasoning (as in the ARstrategies described by points 1 and 4 at the scale), the effective appeal is not
manipulative. On the contrary, it is an advantage. Nevertheless, when
combined with the unacceptable reasoning, the same effective manner of
appealing to the social characteristics is manipulative and thus contains a
fallacy.
(5) Apprisal of the indecisive argumentation. The evaluative concept of both
acceptable and unacceptable (and correspondingly, of both effective and
ineffective) AR-strategies allows for evaluating the situations in which there
are as many good as bad aspects of the reasoning and/or of the social aspects
of the AR-strategies.
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Being suitable for taking into account the adequate evaluative subcomponents, which may precisely be determined from case to case, the suggested
definition of the fallacies and the corresponding evaluative scale provide logical
distinctions necessary for estimating dynamics of argumentation.
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